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THE case of United States v. The Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, lately decided by the United States Supreme
Court, is peculiarly interesting as emphasizing the importance of
certainty of expression in the statute law, and as defining the
relative duties of our courts and legislatures. The heart of the
dispute seems to be the interests of the public, and involved in
those interests we find freedom of individual trade and freedom
of individual contract. Both should be preserved, and yet each
seems to be in apparent conflict with the other. In one sense at
least contracts of trade are contracts in restraint of trade and the
difficulty lies in determining where the line shall be drawn.
At early common law the question was debated, how far indi-
viduals might contract their freedom of trade away; now the
debate has developed into one concerning the power of corpora-
tions to restrict the free exercise of their right to contract. The
change in the complexion of the question denotes merely a
change of society and social development. It was once asked
what interest a tradesman in London could have in what another
might do in Newcastle. The answer was given by a later
period of society, when commerce and trade were more highly
organized and developed. It is now asked what concern it may
be of the public whether its business is conducted by a few
large corporations or by many unorganized individuals.
The common law has been developed until now all contracts
in unreasonable restraint of trade are held to be void and this has
been accepted as the true doctrine both in England and in this
country. But the Act of Congress, passed in i89o, and commonly
known as the Anti-Trust Law, has in terms changed the common
law rule and has prohibited all contracts in restraint of trade,
whether those contracts be reasonable or unreasonable or whether
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the restraint be great or slight. The construction of this law by
the courts became necessary and the intention of those who passed
it became relevant. It was found, however, that the intention
was expressed in legal terms and while by some it was claimed
that these terms should be given their legal significance, by
others a doubt was entertained whether the legal significance
was generally understood, and even if understood and intended
by the Judiciary Committee, whether the intention of that com-
mittee might be taken as the intention of the House and Senate
collectively. On the one hand it is said that law makers must
be presumed to have intended to make a law which would be
reasonable and would have reasonable results, and the dissent-
ing opinion in the case above cited, after tracing the history of
the meaning of the words, "restraint of trade," concludes that
technically and legally they are now equivalent to the words,
"unreasonable restraint of trade." On the other hand it is con-
tended that the duty of a court is not to make laws or even to
amend them, and if the use of reasonable means of interpretation
does not render the spirit of the law certain, that then its letter
should be followed. In the one case the consideration of results
predominates, in the other the consideration of the means to be
employed. Indeed if you adopt the principle that words which
have a technical as well as a popular meaning should be construed
to have that meaning which under the circumstances it can be
presumed that they were intended to have, you are even then
brought face to face with the circumstances surrounding the
passage of the law, and the evident uncertainty of the legislative
mind, equalled only by the uncertainty of its expression, renders
certainty impossible.
The difference seems apparently to be one of legal techni-
cality, and to be open to different views. The proximate cause
of the difficulty, however, should not be attributed to an abstruse-
ness of legal science or to an exaggerated acuteness of the legal
profession. The real cause presents an uncertain intention
quite as much as an uncertain expression and the responsibility
for this uncertainty rests with the legislative and not with the
judicial department of our government. The duty of law mak-
ing is entrusted to Congress; the duty of law interpreting is left
to the Supreme Court. But a law must exist before it may be
interpreted and there must be an intention before one may be
found. The tendency on the part of legislatures to throw upon
our courts the duty of legislation as well as interpretation is
singularly illustrated in this Anti-Trust Law. Disagreeing
among themselves our Representatives seem to have depended
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upon the Supreme Court not only to refrain from reading the
rule of reason out of the statute but in effect to read into it a rule
of reason which was not there before. Instead of clearing up
the doubt as to their intention the Legislature cast this imperfect
foundling upon the country and expected the Supreme Court to
father and bring it up in the way that it should go. That court,
however, was established for no such purpose, and should cease
to be regarded as the unwilling guardian of laws which are dis-
owned by those who are responsible for their creation, It may
be true that our Judiciary is better fitted than our more imme-
diate Representatives to legislate for the best interests of the
country, but to admit this is to admit the failure of the Republi-
can form of Government.
THE thought occurs, however, that the embarrassment from
which we seem now to be suffering may not wholly be due to un-
certainty of intention or even of expression but to the ,.ncertainty
inherent in the subject itself. The difference of opinion found
in our Supreme Court is not confined to that body or to the Leg-
islature. The whole country, if not the world, shares in their
disagreement, and the question seems to be one which no
statute of Congress or no decree of court may finally determine.
The position of corporations and trusts in the society of to-day is
as strongly advocated by some as denounced by others and the
variation of opinion seems sometimes at least to be partly due to the
varied character of conditions. The cause of the difficulty seems
to be economic development and the settlement should be
brought about by economic forces. Questions of similar impor-
tance have come up before, have met with similar treatment and
their determination by the Supreme Court has been received
with equal dissatisfaction by a large portion of the public. The
Dred Scott decision might be cited for one and the more recent
Income Tax decision for another. No question of economics
was definitely settled by either of those decisions, nor was their
indefiniteness due to the disagreement of the court or to the
closeness of the vote which determined them. The questions
to be decided were not those to which legal principles might con-
clusively be applied, for the questions themselves were economic
and involved principles of a higher order. The question lately
submitted to the Supreme Court may be of a similar character
and require submission to the jury of economic development
before a definite and final result may be obtained.
THERE seems to be a growing tendency on the part of law-
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makers throughout the country to legislate unfavorably to com-
binations of capital of every kind. This tendency has been espe-
cially noticeable in the West, as would naturally be expected
from the local growth of populistic ideas, but it is by no means
confined to that locality, and a striking instance of such legisla-
tion has recently occurred in Connecticut. The fire insurance
companies of the State have been greatly concerned over the
passage, by the lower House of the Legislature, of a bill prohib-
iting combinations of fire-insurance companies to establish
rates. Two things are worthy of remark in connection with this
measure, (i) that it is the first attempt at legislation against
combinations of the kind in the history of the State, which has
been prominent in the insurance business for so many years, and
(2) that the bill was passed over the unanimously unfavorable
report of the Insurance Committee. At the time of going to
press the Senate had not considered the measure, but there was
said to be a strong sentiment in that body favorable to its
becoming a law.
Those who speak with authority on the subject of insurance
are strong in the opinion that the effect of the bill would be to
disorganize the insurance business, and that it would not only
close out the smaller companies but would seriously injure the
larger ones by subjecting them to disastrous competition by out-
side companies not affected by the law. Attention is called to
the fact that the interests of the insurance companies are those
of the insured and that whatever interferes with the prosperity of
the companies lessens the value of the protection that they offer.
There is apparently no complaint of unreasonable rates; they
are said to be lower than those of almost any other State, and
lower than a year ago; and it would seem to be unwise for
Connecticut to discourage those who have developed the insur-
ance business of the State into a science and whose experience
enables them to conduct it for the best interests of all con-
cerned. Whatever the final outcome, the success of the bill in
the House of Representatives is a forcible example of what
European writers have remarked as so characteristic of America
and of American legislation in particular-the tendency to go to
extremes, and at times, regardless of consequences, to carry
matters beyond their logical conclusion. There is now much
complaint against the great corporations and against combina-
tions of wealth generally; therefore the idea of. the lawmakers
seems to be to legislate against them all, without distinction in
favor of those with whose welfare that of the public is so closely
connected.
